Deep Research Archives

The Beijing Gathering: A Strategic Analysis from the U.S. Perspective

1.0. Executive Summary

1.1. A New Strategic Reality

The unprecedented public appearance of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Beijing military parade on September 3, 2025, signals a profound and accelerating shift in the global geopolitical landscape. While the relationship lacks a formal military treaty, it is best described as a "three-way partnership of expediency" united by a shared opposition to American dominance.1 This highly choreographed display of solidarity represents a direct and coordinated challenge to the U.S.-led liberal international order. The event was not merely a ceremonial commemoration but a "carefully orchestrated act of strategic communication," projecting a unified front from an emerging anti-Western bloc and underscoring a new, multi-polar global dynamic centered on Beijing.2

1.2. Core Challenges for the United States

For the United States, the meeting highlights three critical areas of concern: a deepening military-strategic convergence, an interconnected economic network designed to circumvent sanctions, and an ideological challenge to American values and leadership. The display of a united front and military might, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine and the escalating tensions around Taiwan, necessitates a complete reevaluation of U.S. strategic assumptions.2 The reliance of these nations on illicit financial networks and sanctions-evasion tactics poses a direct threat to U.S. economic security and undermines a core pillar of American foreign policy.6 Furthermore, the parade’s narrative, which positions China as a leader of a new order based on non-interference and mutual respect, gains traction in a global environment where U.S. diplomatic policies have been perceived as erratic and alienating.4

1.3. Key Recommendations

A successful U.S. response requires a multifaceted and proactive strategy that moves beyond a reactive, sanctions-based approach. This report recommends a strategic reassessment of alliances, with an increased focus on integrating existing trilateral partnerships, such as the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, and fostering new ones, notably with India.8 It is also imperative to develop robust countermeasures to disrupt illicit economic networks and sanction evasion activities, targeting the financial lifelines of these regimes at their source.6 Most critically, the United States must articulate a new foreign policy narrative that actively re-engages with global partners and counters the "alternative" vision presented by Beijing by demonstrating the long-term benefits of a world based on democratic values and the rule of law.3

2.0. The Beijing Gathering: A Statement of Intent

2.1. The Symbolism of a Triumvirate

The joint appearance of President Xi, President Putin, and Chairman Kim on the rostrum overlooking Tiananmen Square was a moment of profound geopolitical symbolism. It was the first time the three leaders had been seen together in public, a sight that sent a powerful and "unmistakeable warning" to the United States and its allies.1 The choreographed image, with the Russian and North Korean leaders flanking Xi, was a deliberate act to project China's future global leadership role and its ambition to lead an alternative, non-Western world order.1 The event itself was the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, a historical moment that China has reframed as the "War of Resistance against Japanese aggression".3 This historical framing allowed China to position itself not as a rising revisionist power, but as a staunch defender of the post-WWII international order and a key contributor to its founding institutions, such as the United Nations.11 However, this narrative is selectively employed to serve a contemporary objective: to demonstrate opposition to what it calls "hegemony and power politics".11 The deeper meaning of the parade is a celebration of a new global order. By gathering dozens of national leaders, including those from countries in the Global South considered "anti-western or anti-US," Xi is signaling that the U.S.-led system is not the only viable model for international relations.4 This calculated projection of a new order is a masterstroke of statecraft, reframing a historical commemoration into a platform for future geopolitical realignment. The U.S. must understand that this is a multi-vector challenge that cannot be addressed by focusing solely on military deterrence. The true threat lies in the combined, synergistic effect of the military display, the diplomatic signaling of an alternative world order, and the consolidation of an anti-U.S. bloc.

2.2. A Grand Diplomatic and Martial Performance

The military parade was a central component of this strategic communication. It was a grand "martial performance" designed to project China's military might and its "rapid advance towards global military parity with Washington".1 The display featured a wide array of new military hardware, including a "triad of strategic nuclear forces" showcased for the first time.5 Xi's declaration that China was "unstoppable" was an unmistakable warning aimed directly at Washington.1 The gathering was not an isolated event; it was part of a broader diplomatic push that began with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conference.1 By hosting both events, Xi sought to "set down a marker" that would "reverberate far beyond the White House".1 The SCO, which includes Russia and other non-Western states, positions itself as a direct alternative to U.S.-led multilateral organizations like NATO.3 The use of both a commemorative military parade and a regional security summit demonstrates a sophisticated, multi-vector approach to challenging U.S. influence. The U.S. should recognize that its response must be equally multifaceted, targeting the military, economic, and diplomatic pillars of U.S. global leadership in a single, concentrated effort.

3.0. A Partnership of Expediency: Motivations and Dependencies

3.1. Individual and Collective Interests

The relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea is best characterized as a "partnership of expediency" rather than a formal, cohesive alliance.1 Their unity is based on a "shared opposition to American hegemony" and a rejection of the Western-dominated financial system, not on a common positive vision for the future.1 Each state's participation is driven by a unique set of national self-interests, as illustrated in the table below.

Actor Primary Motivation Key Dependencies China Global Pre-eminence & Countering U.S. Containment Depends on Russian energy and a stable border with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Needs Russia as a distraction to the U.S..4 Russia Escaping Isolation & Sustaining the War in Ukraine Depends on Chinese economic support, including access to dual-use goods and technologies, to circumvent sanctions. Relies on North Korean military hardware and troops.14 North Korea Regime Legitimacy, Economic Aid, & Military Modernization Depends on China as its main economic lifeline and trading partner. Seeks military assistance from Russia and a seat in the anti-U.S. bloc.12

This transactional nature of the partnership is a critical point for U.S. policymakers. It demonstrates that the relationship is not based on shared values or altruism, but on pragmatic calculations.1

3.2. A Fragile Alliance: Internal Tensions and Historical Mistrust

Despite the show of unity, the long-term viability of this partnership is "highly questionable".1 A key vulnerability that the United States can potentially leverage is the historical and ongoing mistrust among the three nations. Russia harbors a "historical, visceral fear of Chinese expansionism".1 Similarly, North Korea, whose "perpetual impecuniousness" worries Beijing, fears Chinese domination.1 Analysts also note that China remains "deeply wary of growing North Korean nuclear power" and has previously supported international sanctions against Pyongyang.13 The three-way relationship is a "partnership of expediency, lacking ideological, intellectual or moral underpinning".1 A U.S. strategy that treats these three nations as a single, monolithic bloc is a strategic error. The core of their relationship is transactional, based on what each state can gain from the other. A nuanced U.S. approach could seek to exploit these internal tensions, playing on the very fears of Chinese or Russian domination that exist within the partnership itself. This requires a shift from a broad-brush containment policy to a more targeted, diplomatic approach that recognizes and leverages these internal dynamics.

4.0. Military and Security Convergence: A New Threat Calculus

4.1. The Ukraine-DPRK Nexus and Global Ripple Effects

The Beijing meeting was not a precursor to military cooperation; it was a celebration of an existing, battlefield-tested partnership. North Korea has provided Russia with "thousands of troops" and "significant quantities of military equipment," including ballistic missiles and artillery, for the war in Ukraine.4 During their bilateral meeting in Beijing, Kim Jong-un pledged to provide "all possible assistance" to Moscow, reiterating it as a "fraternal duty".15 The conflict in Ukraine has served as a proving ground for this anti-Western bloc. North Korea's military assistance is not just a transactional deal for cash and aid; it is a strategic move for Pyongyang to prove its value as a security partner and "elevate its role on the global stage".18 For China, the war serves as a "distraction to the U.S." and an invaluable source of "lessons" for a potential Taiwan contingency.4 The U.S. must view the Ukraine war and the Indo-Pacific theater as increasingly interconnected. The weapons and tactics tested in one region are informing strategies in the other, necessitating a unified U.S. strategic response that links support for Ukraine with deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, rather than viewing them as separate, regional challenges.

4.2. China's Modernization and Deterrence

The parade was a potent display of China's "rapid advance towards global military parity with Washington".1 It featured a "triad of strategic nuclear forces" and new hypersonic, nuclear-capable, and long-range missiles designed to target U.S. naval assets.5

4.2.1. Key Hardware Displayed

The parade offered a glimpse into China's developing military capabilities, including: DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile: A new mobile-launched system with a range of over 12,000 kilometers (7,500 miles).5 DF-5C silo-based missile: An updated variant with an estimated range of 20,000 kilometers.5 YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20: New long-range, hypersonic anti-ship missiles that are difficult to intercept.5 J-35 stealth multirole fighter: The new carrier-based version.5 AJX002 submarine drone: A newly debuted "cutting-edge surprise weapon for naval combat".5

4.2.2. A Challenge to U.S. Naval Supremacy

The display of new anti-ship missiles and naval drones is a direct, targeted challenge to the core of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy—its naval power. These systems are explicitly designed to "signal to the United States they should think twice about entering into a conflict, if there ever is one, in support of Taiwan".5 The U.S. cannot afford to be complacent about its naval dominance. China's military development is not about simple modernization; it's about developing specific asymmetric capabilities to counter U.S. power projection in a potential Taiwan scenario. This necessitates a review of U.S. naval strategy, including force posture, the role of aircraft carriers, and the development of new countermeasures to hypersonic and autonomous systems.

5.0. Economic Interdependence and Sanctions Evasion

5.1. The Sanctions Loophole

The Beijing meeting underscores the ineffectiveness of the current sanctions regime against North Korea and Russia. North Korea has become "adept at avoiding sanctions pressures" by reallocating trade to countries "unwilling to enforce economic sanctions," with China serving as its primary economic lifeline.19 Similarly, Russia has found a key partner in China, which provides the dual-use goods and technologies needed to circumvent Western financial and trade restrictions.14 The failure of sanctions has had a perverse effect: it has driven targeted states into closer alignment. As one expert argues, sanctions are "far more likely to drive the subject into increased resistance, expanded defense, and development of alternative markets and alliances".20 The case of Russia and North Korea is a textbook example of this dynamic, directly countering the U.S. policy premise that sanctions are a primary tool for leverage. The U.S. must rethink its over-reliance on broad sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Instead of leading to compliance, these measures are creating the very anti-U.S. bloc they are intended to prevent. This suggests a need for a new approach that combines targeted, precise sanctions with diplomatic off-ramps.

5.2. North Korea's Illicit Revenue Streams

The meeting highlights the ongoing threat of North Korea's sophisticated cyber and financial operations. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has sanctioned North Korean entities for using remote IT worker schemes to generate "hundreds of millions of dollars" for the regime's weapons programs.6 These workers use fraudulent identities, stolen personas, and false documents to infiltrate legitimate companies, including those in the United States.6 They even use AI-powered tools like Claude to create convincing professional backgrounds and deliver technical work, demonstrating a high level of operational security and technological sophistication.7 This is not just a sanctions-evasion tactic; it is a new form of state-sponsored economic warfare. The use of remote workers to clandestinely introduce malware and exfiltrate proprietary data from U.S. companies represents a silent, ongoing threat to U.S. economic and national security.6 This threat operates in a grey zone, making traditional military or diplomatic responses difficult. The U.S. needs to recognize that the enemy is no longer just a state-on-state actor. It is a networked threat requiring a similarly networked response involving inter-agency collaboration between the Treasury, FBI, and Department of Defense to target and dismantle these illicit revenue streams and cut off the funding for the DPRK's weapons programs at the source.

6.0. The U.S. Response: Strategic Challenges and a Path Forward

6.1. The Challenge of "America First" Diplomacy

The U.S. President Donald Trump’s reaction to the event was "predictably, all about him," framing the meeting as a personal "conspiracy" against the U.S..1 This self-referential messaging stands in stark contrast to the highly disciplined, strategic communication of the Beijing gathering. The U.S. must move beyond "transactional and erratic" diplomacy and develop a coherent, long-term strategy that can withstand changes in administration.2 The punitive trade tariffs and cuts to foreign aid have created a "vacuum on the global stage" that China is actively benefiting from, even without being proactive.4 Many countries, particularly in the Global South, now see China as a "more reliable partner" that offers political stability and money "without demanding democratic reforms or human rights protections".4 A credible U.S. response requires not just countering the China-Russia-DPRK bloc, but re-engaging with the world on issues of shared interest and demonstrating a consistent, reliable commitment to its values and partners.

6.2. Recommendations for a Proactive U.S. Strategy

The United States must implement a proactive, multifaceted strategy to address the challenges posed by this emerging bloc.

Strategic Challenge Recommended Policy Responses Rationale Military Convergence Enhance trilateral military exercises and intelligence sharing with key partners (e.g., U.S.-Japan-ROK).8 Deepen the strategic partnership with India.9 Reevaluate U.S. naval force posture in the Indo-Pacific. To counter joint threats and project a united front. To improve interoperability and joint deterrence against China's modernized military. To address a direct challenge to U.S. naval supremacy.5 Sanctions Evasion Shift from broad-based sanctions to targeted, intelligence-led operations.6 Establish multi-agency task forces to dismantle illicit financial and cyber networks that sustain the regimes.7 To cut off funding for weapons of mass destruction programs. To address a new form of state-sponsored economic warfare. Ideological Competition Articulate a new, compelling vision for global cooperation based on shared prosperity and the rule of law.3 Actively re-engage diplomatically with the Global South, demonstrating U.S. reliability and support beyond a "zero-sum" framework.3 To rebuild trust and counter the "alternative" narrative presented by Beijing. To fill the diplomatic vacuum created by past U.S. policies.

The U.S. must also reassess the role of sanctions and diplomacy. Current sanctions against North Korea have been largely ineffective and may be counterproductive.19 The U.S. should explore a new diplomatic path that involves targeted, verifiable steps toward denuclearization in exchange for specific, non-military sanctions relief.

7.0. Conclusion: A New Geopolitical Landscape

The Beijing meeting was more than a ceremonial event; it was a deliberate and cohesive projection of power from an emerging anti-Western bloc. The partnership of expediency, while not a formal axis, presents a formidable and unified front against U.S. hegemony, leveraging a multi-vector strategy that combines military modernization, economic interconnectedness, and a compelling ideological narrative. The United States must recognize the interconnected nature of the challenges in Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, the perverse effects of its sanctions policy, and the ideological vacuum created by its recent foreign policy. 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