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South Korea's Corporate Tax Competitiveness and the Global Debate on Redistributive Taxation: An Economic and Philosophical Analysis

Part I: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea's Corporate Tax Regime

Introduction to Part I

The question of whether a nation's corporate tax rate is "high" or "low" is central to debates on economic competitiveness, foreign investment, and fiscal policy. This initial section of the report directly addresses the inquiry into the global standing of South Korea's corporate tax system. It moves beyond a simplistic declaration to provide a multi-layered, data-driven analysis that contextualizes South Korea's tax policies within global, regional, and institutional frameworks. By dissecting the intricate components of the nation's tax architecture and juxtaposing them against key international benchmarks, this analysis will deliver a nuanced and empirically grounded verdict on its competitiveness.

Section 1: The Architecture of South Korean Corporate Taxation

To accurately assess South Korea's corporate tax system on a global scale, it is essential first to understand its domestic structure. The system is characterized by a progressive framework supplemented by several other taxes and regulations that collectively define the true corporate tax burden. This structure reflects a policy approach aimed not only at revenue generation but also at influencing corporate behavior. The foundation of the system is a four-tiered progressive Corporate Income Tax (CIT) structure. For the 2024 fiscal year, the rates are as follows 1: 9% on the first KRW 200 million of taxable income. 19% on taxable income over KRW 200 million up to KRW 20 billion. 21% on taxable income over KRW 20 billion up to KRW 300 billion. 24% on taxable income exceeding KRW 300 billion. However, these central government rates do not represent the complete tax liability. A mandatory local income surtax, calculated as 10% of the CIT, is levied on top of the national tax. This elevates the effective statutory rates for corporations, resulting in a more comprehensive picture of the tax burden.1

Taxable Income Bracket (KRW) Central Government CIT Rate (%) Local Surtax (10% of CIT) (%) Combined Effective Rate (%) Up to 200 million 9 0.9 9.9 Over 200 million to 20 billion 19 1.9 20.9 Over 20 billion to 300 billion 21 2.1 23.1 Over 300 billion 24 2.4 26.4 Table 1: South Korea's Corporate Income Tax Brackets (2024, Including Local Surtax). Sources: 1

Beyond this primary rate structure, South Korea employs additional tax mechanisms. The Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) establishes a floor for corporate taxation, ensuring that companies cannot use exemptions and deductions to eliminate their tax liability entirely. The AMT rates range from 7% for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to a top rate of 17% for large corporations with taxable income over KRW 100 billion.1 Furthermore, the Accumulated Earnings Tax (AET) applies a 20% penalty tax on corporate earnings that are not utilized for specific purposes such as facility investments, wage increases, or research and development.2 This tax is explicitly designed to discourage the hoarding of cash and to stimulate reinvestment into the domestic economy, showcasing how the tax system is used as a tool of industrial policy. The intricate nature of this system—combining a progressive structure with a mandatory surtax and behavior-shaping levies like the AMT and AET—indicates that a single headline rate is an insufficient measure of the true tax environment. The system is more interventionist than a simple flat-tax regime, reflecting a government strategy that balances revenue needs with specific economic incentives.

Section 2: South Korea in the Global Context - A Data-Driven Comparison

With a clear understanding of its domestic structure, South Korea's corporate tax regime can be accurately benchmarked against its international peers. This comparison reveals a tax system that is neither excessively high nor exceptionally low, but rather strategically positioned among the world's major economies.

Subsection 2.1: Comparison with OECD and G7 Nations

South Korea's top combined statutory corporate tax rate of 26.4% places it slightly above the 2024 average for countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which stands at 23.85%.5 However, when compared to the average of the Group of Seven (G7) nations—the world's largest advanced economies—South Korea's rate is slightly more competitive, sitting just below the G7 average of 27.15%.5 This positioning is significant. It suggests that while South Korea is not a low-tax jurisdiction relative to the broad spectrum of developed countries, its corporate tax burden is in line with, and even slightly favorable compared to, the major industrial powers with which it often competes for capital and trade. This reflects a long-term global trend where corporate tax rates have fallen dramatically since the 1980s before stabilizing in recent years; the average statutory rate across OECD countries has settled around 21.1% since 2019, down from 28% in 2000.6

Subsection 2.2: Regional Benchmarking - East Asian Competitors

The competitive landscape appears different when viewed through a regional lens. Key economic hubs in East Asia often employ more aggressive tax policies to attract foreign investment. Singapore, for instance, maintains a flat corporate tax rate of 17% and offers substantial tax exemptions for new companies.8 Similarly, Taiwan imposes a flat rate of 20% on corporate income above a small threshold.11 Compared to these jurisdictions, South Korea's tax system is considerably more burdensome, particularly for large, profitable enterprises subject to the top marginal rate. This highlights the intense tax competition within the region, where financial and technological centers leverage simple, low-tax regimes as a primary tool of economic policy.

Country/Region Top Combined Statutory Corporate Tax Rate (%) South Korea 26.4 G7 Average 27.15 OECD Average 23.85 Japan 30.62 Germany 30.0 United States 21.0 (Federal only) Singapore 17.0 Taiwan 20.0 Table 2: Comparative Corporate Tax Rates - South Korea vs. Key Benchmarks (2024). Note: The U.S. rate does not include state-level corporate taxes, which vary. Sources: 2

Subsection 2.3: The Global Minimum Tax and Its Implications

A pivotal development reshaping the landscape of international corporate taxation is the OECD/G20's Pillar Two initiative, which establishes a global minimum effective tax rate of 15% for multinational enterprises (MNEs) with annual revenues exceeding €750 million.1 This framework is designed to curb base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by reducing the incentive for MNEs to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. For South Korea, where all corporate tax brackets are well above the 15% threshold, the immediate impact is not a required increase in its own rates. Instead, the effect is strategic. The global minimum tax fundamentally alters the nature of tax competition. By establishing a global tax floor, it diminishes the appeal of traditional tax havens that have historically attracted mobile corporate profits with near-zero tax rates. This shift makes countries like South Korea, which offer a stable regulatory environment, a skilled workforce, and a large domestic market, relatively more attractive. As the tax advantages of locating in a low-tax jurisdiction are eroded, non-tax factors, where South Korea holds a competitive edge, become more decisive in investment decisions. Consequently, the global minimum tax initiative indirectly bolsters South Korea's tax competitiveness, not by lowering its rates, but by raising the rates of its low-tax competitors.

Section 3: Verdict on South Korea's Tax Competitiveness

In conclusion, the assertion that South Korea's corporate tax rate is "low" is factually inaccurate when viewed in absolute global or regional terms. Its top combined rate of 26.4% is higher than the OECD average and substantially exceeds the rates offered by key regional competitors like Singapore and Taiwan. However, the term "low" is relative and context-dependent. For a large, highly developed industrial economy, South Korea's tax rate is not an outlier. It is competitive with, and even slightly lower than, the average rate among the G7 nations. The nation's tax policy appears designed not to compete as a low-tax haven, but as a stable, high-value economic center with a reasonable tax burden commensurate with its level of development and public services. In the emerging post-Pillar Two global tax environment, where the benefits of aggressive tax avoidance strategies are being curtailed, South Korea's position as a predictable and compliant jurisdiction may prove to be a significant competitive advantage.

Part II: The Rationale for Redistributive Taxation - A Multi-Disciplinary Inquiry

Introduction to Part II

The second part of the user's query moves from the empirical to the theoretical, asking for an investigation into the rationale behind taxing the affluent to provide for the less affluent. This question lies at the heart of modern political and economic thought, touching upon deeply held beliefs about fairness, efficiency, and the fundamental purpose of the state. This analysis will explore the multifaceted arguments that form the intellectual foundation for progressive and redistributive tax policies, drawing from the fields of economics, philosophy, and political science to provide a comprehensive answer.

Section 4: The Economic Case for Taxing the Affluent

For much of the 20th century, a dominant view in economics was the "equity-efficiency trade-off," which posited that efforts to create a more equal distribution of income would inevitably come at the cost of reduced economic efficiency and growth. However, a significant body of modern economic theory and empirical evidence challenges this notion, arguing instead that a certain level of redistribution is not only compatible with a healthy economy but may be essential for its long-term stability and dynamism.

Subsection 4.1: Keynesian Principles and the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC)

A foundational economic argument for redistribution stems from the work of John Maynard Keynes and the concept of the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC). The MPC measures the proportion of an additional dollar of income that a household will spend on consumption rather than save.15 The core of the argument is straightforward: lower-income households have a high MPC. They must spend a large fraction of any new income on immediate necessities like food, housing, and transportation. Conversely, high-income households have a much lower MPC and a higher marginal propensity to save, as their basic needs are already met, and additional income is more likely to be saved or invested.15 This disparity has profound macroeconomic implications. Because the spending of one person is the income of another, concentrating wealth in the hands of those with a low MPC can lead to a shortfall in aggregate demand, as a significant portion of the nation's income is withdrawn from the active economy through savings. Redistributive tax policies—such as progressive income taxes that fund transfer payments to lower-income households—shift resources from those with a low propensity to consume to those with a high propensity to consume. This act of redistribution increases overall consumption, boosts aggregate demand, and stimulates broader economic activity through what is known as the Keynesian "multiplier effect".16 From this perspective, redistribution is not merely a social policy but a potent tool for macroeconomic management and stabilization.

Subsection 4.2: The Inequality-Growth Nexus - Evidence from the IMF and OECD

Building on these Keynesian foundations, recent empirical work from major international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the OECD has provided powerful evidence that high levels of inequality can act as a direct drag on long-term economic growth. This research represents a significant paradigm shift, reframing the debate from a simple trade-off to a more complex relationship where extreme inequality itself becomes a source of economic inefficiency. A landmark IMF study found a robust statistical relationship between income distribution and subsequent economic growth. The analysis revealed that when the income share of the top 20% of the population increases, GDP growth tends to decline over the medium term. Conversely, when the income share of the bottom 20% increases, GDP growth accelerates.19 This finding directly contradicts the "trickle-down" theory and suggests that fostering a strong middle class and improving the lot of the poor are crucial drivers of sustainable growth. The mechanisms through which inequality harms growth are multifaceted. High inequality can suppress human capital accumulation, as lower-income families are unable to afford quality education and healthcare for their children, leading to a less productive workforce in the future.19 It can also lead to underinvestment in public goods like infrastructure and education, as the wealthy elite may use their concentrated political power to advocate for lower taxes and reduced public spending. Furthermore, extreme inequality has been linked to greater economic and financial instability, as it can fuel credit booms and increase the risk of financial crises.19

Subsection 4.3: The Economic Multiplier of Social Safety Nets

The economic case for redistribution is further strengthened by research from the World Bank on the impact of social safety nets. These programs, which include cash transfers, food assistance, and social pensions, are often viewed simply as a cost or a drain on public resources. However, the World Bank's analysis reframes them as productive economic investments with significant positive returns.22 A key finding from this body of work is that well-designed social protection programs generate a substantial local economic multiplier effect. For every dollar transferred to a poor family, it is estimated that an additional $1.50 in economic activity is generated within their local community, for a total impact of $2.50.22 This occurs because transfer payments are spent at local businesses, supporting local jobs and stimulating further rounds of economic activity. These programs do more than just alleviate poverty; they build human capital by improving nutrition and educational outcomes, empower women, and help households build resilience to economic and climate shocks.24 This modern economic perspective transforms the debate about redistribution. It is no longer a zero-sum game of taking from one group to give to another, but is increasingly understood as a positive-sum investment in the foundations of a more resilient, stable, and ultimately more prosperous economy for all.

Section 5: Philosophical and Ethical Foundations of Redistribution

Beyond the pragmatic economic arguments, the case for redistributive taxation rests on deep philosophical and ethical foundations concerning the nature of justice, fairness, and moral obligation within a society. These arguments challenge the idea that individuals have an absolute moral claim to their pre-tax income and instead posit that the distribution of resources is a matter of collective moral concern.

Subsection 5.1: Taxation and the Social Contract - A Rawlsian Perspective

One of the most influential modern frameworks for this view comes from the philosopher John Rawls and his theory of "justice as fairness." Rawls asks us to imagine an "original position," a hypothetical scenario where rational individuals must agree on the basic principles of their society from behind a "veil of ignorance," meaning they do not know their own social status, talents, or position in life.27 Rawls argues that from this impartial standpoint, individuals would agree to two principles of justice. The second of these, the "difference principle," is most relevant to taxation. It states that social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.27 Inequalities are permissible only if they work to lift the floor for everyone. Within this Rawlsian framework, taxation is not merely a means of funding the government; it is the primary instrument for realizing the difference principle. The pre-tax distribution of income and wealth, shaped by the "natural lottery" of talents and fortunate social circumstances, is seen as morally arbitrary. Therefore, a just society has the right and the obligation to use the tax-and-transfer system to correct this distribution and ensure the resulting post-tax arrangement is fair.28 Taxation becomes the mechanism through which the social contract is fulfilled, ensuring that the fruits of social cooperation benefit all, especially those at the bottom.

Subsection 5.2: A Utilitarian Imperative - The Arguments of Peter Singer

A different but equally powerful ethical argument for redistribution comes from the utilitarian tradition, most famously articulated by philosopher Peter Singer. Utilitarianism holds that the most ethical action is the one that maximizes overall happiness or "utility" and minimizes suffering.31 In his seminal essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Singer puts forth a simple but radical principle: "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it".32 He illustrates this with the famous thought experiment of a drowning child: if you could save a child from drowning in a shallow pond at the cost of ruining your expensive shoes, you have a clear moral obligation to do so. The value of the child's life vastly outweighs the value of the shoes.32 Singer extends this logic globally. He argues that there is no morally relevant difference between the drowning child nearby and a starving child thousands of miles away. The money an affluent person spends on a luxury—a designer handbag, a lavish meal—could, if donated to an effective charity, save a life. Because the moral value of saving a life is incomparably greater than the value of the luxury, the affluent have a strong moral duty to give. This reframes giving to the poor not as an act of optional "charity," but as a fundamental moral obligation.33 While Singer's argument applies to individual giving, it provides a powerful ethical foundation for state-led redistribution through taxation, which can be seen as a collective mechanism for fulfilling this moral duty. Both the Rawlsian and Singerian perspectives, though arriving from different starting points, converge on a crucial point that challenges absolute notions of property rights. They argue that an individual's pre-tax income is not an inviolable moral entitlement. For Rawls, this is because our ability to earn is a product of social cooperation and is therefore subject to the principles of justice that govern that cooperation. For Singer, it is because the moral claim of those suffering from preventable harm outweighs the claim of the affluent to their surplus wealth. This provides a robust ethical counterargument to purely economic claims that taxation is an infringement on property rights.

Section 6: The Socio-Political Dimensions of Inequality and Taxation

The distribution of wealth in a society is not merely an economic or philosophical issue; it has profound consequences for social cohesion and political stability. A growing body of research in political science indicates that high and rising levels of economic inequality can corrode the foundations of democratic societies. Income inequality is strongly correlated with increased political instability, social unrest, and the erosion of democratic institutions.35 The mechanism for this is often political polarization. Wide economic gaps can fuel a sense of grievance, frustration, and alienation among large segments of the population who feel "left behind" by the economic system.35 This creates a fertile environment for populist leaders, who can exploit this social discontent by blaming specific groups—be they economic elites, immigrants, or minorities—and attacking the democratic institutions, such as a free press and an independent judiciary, that are seen as upholding the status quo.35 This politically induced instability can create a vicious cycle. An unpredictable political environment, where property rights may seem insecure and policies can change radically, deters the kind of long-term, stable investment that is crucial for economic growth.36 In this sense, redistributive taxation can be viewed as a form of political insurance. By reducing extreme inequality and funding social safety nets, it can help to mitigate social discontent, reduce polarization, and thereby safeguard the political stability upon which a prosperous market economy depends.

Section 7: Counterarguments and Economic Constraints

No analysis of redistributive taxation would be complete without a rigorous examination of the powerful counterarguments and real-world constraints that challenge its implementation. These arguments primarily center on the potential for high taxes to stifle economic incentives and the mobility of capital in a globalized world.

Subsection 7.1: Supply-Side Concerns and the Laffer Curve

The most prominent theoretical argument against high progressive tax rates is encapsulated by the Laffer Curve. Popularized by economist Arthur Laffer, this theory posits that there is a relationship between tax rates and total tax revenue. At a 0% tax rate, revenue is zero. At a 100% tax rate, revenue is also presumed to be zero, as there would be no incentive to work or invest. Therefore, there must be some revenue-maximizing tax rate in between these two extremes.38 The core of the supply-side argument is that high marginal tax rates disincentivize productive activity. They reduce the reward for working an extra hour, making an additional investment, or taking an entrepreneurial risk. If rates are set too high (on the right side of the Laffer Curve), a tax cut could theoretically lead to such a surge in economic activity that it would generate more tax revenue, not less.38 While the Laffer Curve is logically sound at its extremes, its practical application is highly contested. The primary criticism is that the revenue-maximizing rate is unknown and can only be estimated. Most empirical studies suggest that the tax rates in major developed economies, including the United States, are on the left, upward-sloping portion of the curve. This means that while tax increases may have some negative incentive effects, they would still lead to an increase in government revenue, and tax cuts would lead to a decrease.39 Nonetheless, the underlying concern about the impact of high marginal rates on economic incentives remains a central and valid part of the policy debate.

Subsection 7.2: The Risk of Capital Flight in a Globalized Economy

Perhaps the most significant practical constraint on a single nation's ability to implement highly progressive tax policies is the mobility of capital. In a globalized economy, financial capital and corporate investment are highly mobile. If a country imposes high taxes on corporate profits or wealth, corporations and wealthy individuals may have the ability to move their assets and operations to lower-tax jurisdictions.43 This creates the risk of capital flight and an erosion of the tax base, effectively placing a ceiling on how high a country can unilaterally raise its taxes without harming its own economy. This dynamic has historically fueled a "race to the bottom" in corporate taxation, as countries compete to attract mobile investment by lowering their rates.43 This real-world constraint underscores a critical point: the effectiveness of national tax policy is increasingly dependent on international cooperation. Initiatives like the OECD's global minimum tax are a direct response to this challenge, attempting to establish a floor for tax competition and limit the ability of MNEs to shift profits to tax havens. Such international agreements can mitigate the risk of capital flight, thereby giving individual nations more policy space to design tax systems that are both efficient and equitable.

Conclusion: Synthesizing the Evidence and Policy Implications

This report has sought to address two fundamental questions regarding taxation: the specific issue of South Korea's global corporate tax standing and the broader, universal debate over wealth redistribution. The analysis reveals a complex and evolving landscape where old assumptions are being challenged by new evidence and global realities. First, the factual analysis demonstrates that describing South Korea's corporate tax rate as "low" is an oversimplification. While it is higher than many OECD countries and its direct regional competitors, it remains competitive within the cohort of the world's largest industrial economies, the G7. Its position is that of a stable, developed nation with a moderate-to-high tax burden, a stance that is becoming more, not less, competitive as global initiatives like the 15% minimum tax reduce the allure of traditional tax havens. Second, the investigation into the rationale for redistributive taxation reveals a powerful convergence of arguments from economics, philosophy, and political science. The modern economic consensus, supported by institutions like the IMF and World Bank, increasingly views extreme inequality not as a trade-off for efficiency, but as a direct impediment to sustainable, long-term growth. This is complemented by profound philosophical arguments, from both social contract and utilitarian traditions, that frame redistribution not as a confiscatory act, but as a moral and social necessity for a just and humane society. Finally, political analysis links high inequality to the social polarization and instability that can undermine both democracy and the market economy. These arguments, however, are tempered by significant constraints, most notably the potential for high tax rates to dampen economic incentives and the very real risk of capital flight in a globalized world. The tension between the desire for a more equitable society and the economic realities of a competitive global market defines the central challenge for modern fiscal policy. Ultimately, the most powerful arguments for redistribution (combating inequality's drag on growth and democracy) and the most potent arguments against it (the risk of capital flight) point toward a shared conclusion: the growing necessity of international cooperation. Unilateral national policies face inherent limitations. Collective action, such as the global minimum tax, represents a potential path forward, creating a framework where countries can pursue more equitable domestic policies without triggering a destructive race to the bottom. The global debate is shifting from whether to address inequality to how to do so effectively, recognizing that a fair distribution of economic resources may be a fundamental prerequisite for lasting prosperity.

Arguments FOR Redistribution Arguments AGAINST/CONSTRAINTS on Redistribution Keynesian Demand Stimulation: Higher MPC of lower-income groups boosts aggregate demand. Laffer Curve/Incentive Reduction: High marginal tax rates may disincentivize work, saving, and investment. Inequality-Growth Nexus (IMF/OECD): High inequality harms long-term growth by suppressing human capital and causing instability. Capital Flight: In a globalized economy, high taxes on mobile capital can cause it to move to lower-tax jurisdictions. Social Safety Net Multiplier (World Bank): Transfer payments have a significant positive multiplier effect on local economies. Administrative Complexity: Progressive tax and transfer systems can be complex and costly to administer. Rawlsian Social Contract: Justice requires that inequalities benefit the least-advantaged members of society.

Utilitarian Moral Imperative: A moral duty exists to prevent suffering when the cost is not of comparable moral importance.

Political Stability: Reducing inequality can mitigate social unrest and strengthen democratic institutions.

Table 3: Summary of Arguments for and Against Redistributive Taxation. Sources: 15

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The Marginal Propensity to Consume and the Multiplier - The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/keynes/general-theory/ch10.htm Causes and Consequences of Income Inequality: A Global ..., 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1513.pdf Inequality of Opportunity, Inequality of Income and Economic Growth, WP/19/34, February 2019 - International Monetary Fund (IMF), 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/WP/2019/WPIEA2019034.ashx In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All - OECD, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/in-it-together-why-less-inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en.html Social Protection Overview - World Bank, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotection/overview The State of Social Safety Nets 2018 - World Bank, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionandjobs/publication/the-state-of-social-safety-nets-2018 Safety Nets Overview - World Bank, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/safetynets Economic Opportunities for the Poor through Social Safety Nets - World Bank, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/video/2016/03/23/economic-opportunities-for-the-poor-through-social-safety-nets Chapter 4 | Making Social Safety Net Systems Adaptable to Economic Downturns, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/addressing-country-level-fiscal-and-financial-sector-vulnerabilities/chapter-4-making Florida Law Review - Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1787&context=faculty_scholarship Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax - Seattle University School of ..., 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1612&context=faculty Tax and Globalisation: Toward a New Social Contract | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://academic.oup.com/ojls/article/44/3/487/7637921 To contract or not to contract - International Budget Partnership, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/tax-policy-narratives-social-contract.pdf Utilitarianism - Wikipedia, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism Famine, Affluence and Morality, by Peter Singer · Giving What We Can, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.givingwhatwecan.org/get-involved/videos-books-and-essays/famine-affluence-and-morality-peter-singer THE DISCORDANT SINGER How Peter Singer's Treatment of Global Poverty and Disability Is Inconsistent and Why It Matters, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://hpod.law.harvard.edu/pdf/ajle_a_00014.pdf The Utilitarian Horrors of Peter Singer: Other People's Mothers, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/berkowitz.htm Economic inequality leads to democratic erosion, study finds ..., 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://news.uchicago.edu/story/economic-inequality-leads-democratic-erosion-study-finds www.nber.org, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w4486/w4486.pdf Income Inequality and Political Instability, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://iariw.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Malikov-Alimov-IARIW-2022.pdf Laffer Curve: History and Critique - Investopedia, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/laffercurve.asp Laffer curve - Wikipedia, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laffer_curve The Case Against Higher Tax Rates - Hoover Institution, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.hoover.org/research/case-against-higher-tax-rates Five Critiques of Arthur Laffer's Supply-Side Model Show Tax Cuts as Junk Economics, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://itep.org/debunkinglaffer/ Why the Laffer Curve is garbage - CT Mirror, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://ctmirror.org/2018/01/18/why-the-laffer-curve-is-garbage/ VI. The Effect of Taxes on Capital Flows in: World Economic and Financial Surveys, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781451941883/ch06.xml Some commentators call for the introduction of a wealth tax in the UK. - University of Essex, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.essex.ac.uk/-/media/economics/eesj/spring-2021/ec355_wealth_taxes.pdf The Impact of Income Inequality on Economic Growth - Bertelsmann Stiftung, 8월 4, 2025에 액세스, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/Impulse___2015-05_income_inequality_and_growth.pdf