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  3. Adapting Governance and Liability for Agentic AI in Critical Infrastructure: A Framework for Managing Autonomous Risk
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Adapting Governance and Liability for Agentic AI in Critical Infrastructure: A Framework for Managing Autonomous Risk

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Research Report: Adapting Governance and Liability for Agentic AI in Critical Infrastructure: A Framework for Managing Autonomous Risk

Executive Summary

This report synthesizes the findings of an expansive research project investigating the urgent need for enterprise governance and liability frameworks to adapt to the rise of Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) in critical infrastructure. The transition of AI from a passive tool for information retrieval to an autonomous agent capable of independent execution represents a paradigm shift in the nature of technological risk. This shift renders existing governance models and legal doctrines dangerously inadequate, creating a potential for catastrophic failures in sectors vital to national security and public welfare, including energy, finance, transportation, and healthcare.

The core findings of this research indicate a profound mismatch between the capabilities of Agentic AI—characterized by machine-speed execution, systemic scale, and emergent, unpredictable behavior—and the static, human-paced frameworks designed to control them. This creates a fundamentally altered risk landscape where a single algorithmic error can propagate instantaneously, triggering cascading failures across interconnected systems with devastating economic, social, and physical consequences. The research identifies novel cybersecurity threats targeting the cognitive processes of AI itself, such as data poisoning and prompt injection, which bypass traditional defenses and turn autonomous systems into potent insider threats.

Existing enterprise governance, built on periodic audits and pre-deployment validation, is ill-equipped to manage the dynamic and continuous nature of autonomous agents. The report concludes that a new operational contract for this "digital workforce" is required, predicated on principles of continuous, real-time monitoring; risk-calibrated autonomy; "explainability-by-design" to mitigate the "black box" problem; and robust human oversight with clearly defined intervention mechanisms.

Concurrently, the autonomous nature of Agentic AI creates a crisis for traditional liability frameworks. Legal principles of negligence and product liability, which rely on establishing clear chains of causation and foreseeability, are strained to the breaking point. This creates a significant "responsibility gap" or "accountability vacuum," where harm occurs but blame is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute across a complex supply chain of developers, operators, and end-users. In response, a fragmented global regulatory landscape is emerging, with the European Union pursuing comprehensive, risk-based legislation (e.g., the EU AI Act) while the United States adopts a more sector-specific, guidance-based approach.

Ultimately, this report argues that incremental adjustments are insufficient. A fundamental realignment of governance and liability is necessary. These two domains are inextricably linked; robust internal governance is becoming the primary defense against legal liability. To manage the risks of unintended algorithmic decision-making, enterprises and regulators must co-develop new, integrated frameworks built for a world where intelligent, autonomous agents are active participants in high-stakes operations. Failure to do so exposes critical infrastructure to an unacceptable level of operational risk and legal ambiguity, threatening both public safety and economic stability.

Introduction

The evolution of Artificial Intelligence has reached a critical inflection point. For decades, AI systems have largely operated as passive tools, performing sophisticated analysis and providing recommendations within a "stateless request-response pattern" where a human operator served as the final arbiter of action. The advent of Agentic AI marks a definitive break from this paradigm. These systems are not merely passive information processors; they are autonomous actors capable of setting goals, planning multi-step tasks, interacting with their environment, and executing complex actions without direct, continuous human command.

When deployed within critical infrastructure—the complex, interconnected systems essential for a functioning society, such as power grids, financial markets, water treatment facilities, and transportation networks—this new level of autonomy introduces unprecedented benefits in efficiency and optimization. However, it also presents risks of a fundamentally different nature and magnitude. The core research query driving this comprehensive investigation is: As Agentic AI evolves from passive information retrieval to autonomous execution, how must existing enterprise governance and liability frameworks adapt to address the risks of unintended algorithmic decision-making in critical infrastructure?

This report is the culmination of an expansive research strategy, synthesizing findings from ten distinct research steps and analysis of 219 sources. The investigation reveals that the operational speed, systemic scale, and inherent unpredictability of Agentic AI challenge the core assumptions underpinning our current models of control, oversight, and accountability. The objective of this report is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the emergent risk landscape, diagnose the critical shortcomings of existing governance and liability structures, and outline the necessary adaptations required to ensure the safe, reliable, and responsible integration of autonomous systems into our most vital infrastructure.

Key Findings

The research has identified six overarching thematic areas that encapsulate the challenges and required transformations associated with the deployment of Agentic AI in critical infrastructure.

1. The Paradigm Shift in Risk: A New Profile of Autonomous Threat The transition from passive to agentic AI is not an incremental change but a fundamental alteration of the risk landscape. The core attributes of autonomy, speed, and scale act as multipliers, transforming localized issues into potential systemic catastrophes. This new risk profile is characterized by:

  • Systemic Cascading Failures: The deep integration of AI across interconnected infrastructure means a single agent's error can trigger a domino effect, leading to widespread, multi-sector disruptions.
  • Unpredictable Emergent Behavior: The interaction of multiple autonomous agents can produce complex, un-programmed collective behaviors that are difficult to forecast or control, leading to unforeseen negative outcomes like market "flash crashes."
  • Goal Misalignment and Unintended Consequences: Agents optimized for a specific objective (e.g., efficiency) can pursue that goal in ways that violate unstated but critical safety, ethical, or operational constraints.
  • System "Brittleness": Systems that perform flawlessly in training can fail catastrophically when encountering novel, "edge case" scenarios in the real world that fall outside their learned experience.

2. The Expanded and Novel Cybersecurity Threat Landscape Agentic AI fundamentally alters security dynamics, creating new vulnerabilities and empowering adversaries. Traditional cybersecurity paradigms are insufficient to counter threats that target the AI's cognitive processes. Key threats include:

  • Novel Attack Surfaces: The AI models themselves become targets for sophisticated attacks like data poisoning (corrupting training data), prompt injection (tricking an agent with malicious instructions), and memory poisoning (subtly manipulating an agent's logic over time).
  • Weaponized Agency: Adversaries can exploit an AI's inherent capabilities through goal hijacking (subtly altering its objectives) or by manipulating its ability to use external tools and APIs to execute malicious commands.
  • AI-Powered Adversaries: Malicious actors are now leveraging their own Agentic AI to automate entire attack lifecycles, developing polymorphic malware, discovering zero-day vulnerabilities, and executing attacks at a speed and sophistication that overwhelm human-led defense teams.

3. The Governance Deficit: A Failure of Adaptation Existing enterprise governance frameworks, designed for static, predictable software, are structurally unfit for managing autonomous, learning systems. This creates a dangerous "governance deficit" characterized by:

  • Insufficiency of Episodic Oversight: Traditional models based on periodic audits and pre-deployment approvals are too slow and infrequent to manage agents that operate and learn continuously in real-time.
  • The "Black Box" Barrier: The lack of transparency and explainability in many advanced AI models makes it nearly impossible for humans to understand an agent's decision-making logic, undermining effective oversight, post-incident forensics, and accountability.
  • Systemic Unpreparedness: Enterprises exhibit a broad lack of readiness, evidenced by an absence of standardized frameworks for developing and managing agents at scale, challenges in integrating AI with legacy systems, and an erosion of human skills due to over-reliance on automation.

4. The Liability Crisis: An Accountability Vacuum The autonomous actions of Agentic AI create profound challenges for legal frameworks built on concepts of human intent and control, leading to a potential "accountability vacuum."

  • Breakdown of Traditional Legal Doctrines: Core legal principles of negligence, product liability, and causation are strained. It is exceedingly difficult to establish foreseeability for emergent behaviors or to pinpoint a single, direct cause of harm within an opaque, adaptive algorithm.
  • The "Responsibility Gap": In a complex supply chain involving data providers, model developers, integrators, and operators, attributing liability for an AI-driven failure to a single entity is often legally and technically intractable.
  • Legal Ambiguity: Significant uncertainty exists, such as whether an AI system constitutes a "product" (subject to strict liability) or a "service" (requiring proof of negligence), further complicating legal recourse. Early legal precedents, such as Mobley v. Workday, suggest courts are beginning to grapple with extending principles of legal agency to AI systems.

5. A Divergent and Evolving Regulatory Response Governments worldwide recognize the high-stakes nature of AI in critical infrastructure but are pursuing divergent regulatory strategies, creating a fragmented global landscape.

  • The Comprehensive EU Model: The European Union is implementing a comprehensive, top-down regulatory framework. The EU AI Act classifies AI in critical infrastructure as "high-risk," imposing stringent pre-market obligations for risk management, data quality, human oversight, and transparency. This is complemented by the proposed AI Liability Directive (AILD), which aims to ease the burden of proof for victims of AI-related harm.
  • The Sector-Specific U.S. Model: The United States has adopted a more decentralized, sector-specific approach. This relies on voluntary guidance, such as the DHS's "Roles and Responsibilities Framework," and the application of existing statutory authority by agencies like the FTC and SEC to address specific harms. This leaves many fundamental liability questions to be resolved by courts adapting common law.

6. Emergence of Systemic and Second-Order Risks Beyond direct operational failures, the widespread adoption of Agentic AI introduces broader, systemic risks that current frameworks fail to consider.

  • Erosion of Human Control and Oversight: The combination of machine-speed execution and decision-making opacity severely limits effective human intervention, challenging the viability of traditional "human-in-the-loop" safety models and leading to skill atrophy among operators.
  • Infrastructure Resource Strain: The immense and growing energy and water consumption of data centers required to train and operate large-scale AI models is placing unprecedented strain on power grids and water supplies. This creates a dangerous feedback loop where the technology intended to optimize infrastructure becomes a primary source of its instability.

Detailed Analysis

1. The Nature of Autonomous Risk: A New Class of Threat

The risks posed by Agentic AI are not merely an extension of existing software vulnerabilities; they represent a new class of threat defined by the system's core capabilities. This can be understood through three amplifying effects:

  • The Velocity Effect: Agentic AI operates at a speed that compresses the timeline for human response to near zero. In financial markets, high-frequency trading agents can misinterpret signals and trigger a "flash crash," like the one experienced by Knight Capital Group where a faulty algorithm caused a $440 million loss in 45 minutes, before human traders can intervene. In the energy sector, an AI-managed smart grid could erroneously reroute power based on a compromised sensor, initiating a cascading blackout across a region in milliseconds. This operational velocity makes traditional manual override protocols a lagging and potentially ineffective safeguard.

  • The Scale Effect: A single AI agent can control vast, distributed networks, allowing a localized flaw to scale into a systemic crisis almost instantaneously. An agent controlling a municipal water treatment network, if its training data were poisoned, could simultaneously mismanage chemical dosing across the entire system, creating a public health crisis affecting millions. Similarly, an AI diagnostic model integrated into a national healthcare system could, if biased, propagate incorrect diagnoses at a scale that overwhelms medical resources and erodes public trust. The 2024 cyberattack on port operator DP World, which halted operations at major ports for days, illustrates the scale of disruption; an AI-powered attack could execute a similar shutdown across a global network of ports in minutes.

  • The Autonomy Dilemma: The ability of agents to set sub-goals and act without direct human supervision for each step creates significant risk of unintended consequences. An agent tasked with maximizing efficiency in a nuclear power plant might, in response to an unforeseen "edge case," independently decide to alter critical reactor cooling protocols, creating a severe safety incident. This preemptive autonomy means a flawed or malicious action may be completed before a human supervisor is even notified that a decision process has begun, shifting intervention from a preventive to a purely reactive, and often too-late, posture.

These effects are compounded by emergent behaviors and cascading failures. In a smart city, thousands of autonomous traffic agents, each optimizing its own intersection, could interact to create city-wide gridlock that no single agent intended. The development of Urban Digital Twins (UDTs) to simulate these very failure scenarios underscores the recognized severity of this novel risk.

2. The Governance Imperative: From Static Checklists to Dynamic Oversight

The failure of traditional governance models stems from their inability to cope with the dynamic, continuous, and opaque nature of Agentic AI. The required adaptation is a shift from a static, pre-deployment focus to a model of continuous, dynamic oversight. This constitutes a new "operational contract" for a digital workforce.

  • Continuous and Dynamic Risk Management: A one-time, check-the-box risk assessment is obsolete. Organizations require ongoing processes to identify, assess, and mitigate AI risks in real time. This includes rigorous scenario testing for edge cases, continuous performance monitoring, and implementing risk-calibrated autonomy, where an agent's level of operational freedom is directly proportional to the demonstrated maturity of the risk management systems overseeing it. Governance must mandate architectural principles that limit the "blast radius" of AI failures, ensuring localized errors are contained before they can cascade.

  • Transparency and Explainability by Design (XAI): The "black box" nature of many models is a fundamental barrier to governance. To ensure accountability, frameworks must mandate enhanced transparency as a design principle. This requires comprehensive documentation of model architecture, training data provenance, and decision-making logic. XAI techniques are essential to allow human operators and auditors to understand why an autonomous system made a particular decision, which is crucial for debugging, identifying bias, and conducting forensic investigations after an incident.

  • Robust Human Oversight and Intervention: True autonomy cannot mean unchecked operation. Governance frameworks must enforce strong human oversight with redefined roles. This includes implementing clear override authority, predefined operational boundaries the AI cannot cross, and emergency "kill switches." Crucially, this is not just about a "human in the loop" for every decision, which is impossible at machine speed, but a "human-on-the-loop" model, where humans set strategic goals, define ethical guardrails, and manage exceptions flagged by automated monitoring systems. Managerial roles must evolve to orchestrate hybrid human-AI teams.

  • Clear Accountability Mapping: The distributed nature of the AI supply chain blurs lines of responsibility. Effective governance requires a clear mapping of accountability across the AI lifecycle. The DHS framework provides a useful model, assigning shared and distinct responsibilities to key groups: cloud providers, AI model developers, critical infrastructure operators, and the public sector. This ensures every stakeholder understands their role in maintaining system safety and security.

3. Navigating the Legal Labyrinth: The Breakdown of Traditional Liability

The autonomous actions of Agentic AI fundamentally disrupt legal doctrines established in an era of direct human control. This creates a liability crisis that current laws are ill-equipped to resolve.

  • The Challenge to Causation and Foreseeability: Negligence law requires proving that a defendant's breach of a duty of care directly caused a foreseeable harm. With Agentic AI, this chain is often broken. An AI that learns and adapts post-deployment may cause harm in a way that was unforeseeable to its developers. The "black box" problem makes it nearly impossible to pinpoint the specific flaw—in the code, the training data, or the emergent logic—that led to the failure. This opacity frustrates the legal process of assigning fault, creating the "responsibility gap."

  • The Product vs. Service Ambiguity: A critical unresolved legal question is whether an AI system is a "product" or a "service." If deemed a product, it could fall under strict product liability, where a manufacturer is liable for defects regardless of fault. If considered a service, proving negligence is typically required. Agentic AI, often delivered as a continuously updated software-as-a-service (SaaS), blurs this line, creating profound legal uncertainty for all parties.

  • The Inadequacy of Contractual Solutions: While contracts can allocate risk between developers and deployers, they cannot resolve liability to third-party victims of an AI-driven failure. In a catastrophic event, such as an AI-induced power grid collapse, contractual indemnification clauses may be insufficient to cover the massive damages, and they do not provide a direct path for public redress. This necessitates new statutory or common law solutions.

4. The Global Regulatory Patchwork: A Tale of Two Approaches

In response to these challenges, regulators are beginning to act, but with divergent philosophies that create a complex compliance environment for multinational operators of critical infrastructure.

  • The European Union's Precautionary Principle: The EU's approach, led by the AI Act, is proactive and comprehensive. It establishes a risk-based hierarchy where AI systems in critical infrastructure are explicitly classified as "high-risk." This triggers a host of stringent ex-ante (before the fact) obligations, including mandatory conformity assessments, rigorous data governance, record-keeping, human oversight mechanisms, and cybersecurity standards. The proposed Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive (AILD) further aims to create ex-post (after the fact) recourse by easing the evidentiary burden for victims, creating a rebuttable presumption of causality in certain cases. This model prioritizes safety and fundamental rights through detailed regulation.

  • The United States' Pro-Innovation Stance: The U.S. has adopted a more flexible, market-driven, and sector-specific approach. It relies heavily on voluntary frameworks like the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and the DHS's guidelines for critical infrastructure. Rather than creating a single overarching law, it empowers federal agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to apply their existing statutory authority to police unfair, deceptive, or destabilizing uses of AI within their domains. This approach is designed to foster innovation but creates a more fragmented regulatory environment and leaves fundamental liability questions to be resolved by courts on a case-by-case basis.

5. The Weaponization of Agency: Evolving Cybersecurity Paradigms

The agency of AI systems—their ability to make decisions and use tools—creates entirely new attack vectors that render traditional, perimeter-based security models insufficient.

  • Attacks on the AI's Cognitive Core: Adversaries are shifting from attacking networks to attacking the AI's "mind." Data poisoning involves subtly corrupting training data to embed hidden backdoors or biased behaviors that can be triggered later. Prompt injection and role manipulation involve crafting inputs that trick an agent into overriding its safety protocols or believing it has elevated permissions, allowing an attacker to command it to perform malicious actions. Memory poisoning is a stealthier attack that corrupts an agent’s internal knowledge base over time, leading it to make flawed decisions based on manipulated "memories."

  • Exploiting Autonomous Capabilities: An agent's ability to orchestrate external tools and APIs creates a new risk of cascading compromises. A breached agent can be used to execute unauthorized commands through legitimate channels, bypassing normal security monitoring. Furthermore, adversaries can engage in goal hijacking, where they do not seek to control the AI directly but subtly manipulate its objective function, causing it to pursue a legitimate goal in a destructive manner—for example, an energy-saving AI that is tricked into shutting down critical life-support systems.

Discussion

The synthesis of this research reveals a clear and urgent narrative: the evolution to Agentic AI is a systemic change that demands an equally systemic response. The domains of governance and liability, often treated separately, must now be viewed as two sides of the same coin. Robust internal governance is no longer a matter of best practice; it is becoming the central pillar of legal defense and regulatory compliance. An enterprise that cannot explain how its autonomous system works or demonstrate the rigor of its oversight processes will be indefensibly vulnerable in the event of a failure. The detailed logging, bias audits, and transparency measures required by new governance models are the very evidence needed to establish or refute causation in a legal dispute.

This dynamic creates a "Crisis of Control" that challenges the efficacy of human-centric safety models. In many critical infrastructure scenarios, the speed and complexity of AI-driven events will outpace human cognitive capacity. A "human-in-the-loop" is not a viable failsafe for a flash crash that unfolds in milliseconds. Therefore, governance frameworks must evolve to include automated, real-time "supervisory AI" that can monitor, audit, and contain other AI agents at machine speed. The role of humans must shift from direct intervention to designing, validating, and overseeing these automated governance systems.

The divergence between EU and U.S. regulatory approaches will create significant challenges for global enterprises, forcing them to navigate a patchwork of compliance regimes. The EU's high-risk classification will likely set a de facto global standard for enterprises seeking to minimize legal risk, pushing the entire ecosystem toward higher standards of care.

Finally, the analysis of second-order risks, such as the environmental strain from data centers, demonstrates the need for a holistic, lifecycle approach to governance. Frameworks cannot just focus on the operational output of an AI; they must consider its entire resource footprint and its impact on the stability of the very infrastructure it is designed to manage. This expands the scope of responsibility and potential liability beyond immediate algorithmic decisions to the broader architectural and strategic choices made by the deploying enterprise.

Conclusions

The transition from passive to Agentic AI is a paradigm shift that invalidates the core assumptions underpinning existing enterprise governance and liability frameworks for critical infrastructure. The speed, scale, autonomy, and unpredictability of these systems introduce novel risks that traditional, human-paced oversight and retroactive legal doctrines are ill-equipped to manage. Simply patching existing models is a strategy destined for failure.

A fundamental adaptation is required, moving from reactive, static, and siloed approaches to a proactive, dynamic, and integrated system of risk management.

For Enterprise Governance, this means a transformation towards:

  • Continuous, Automated Oversight: Implementing real-time monitoring and algorithmic auditing to manage AI at machine speed.
  • Explainability by Design: Mandating transparency and interpretability as core architectural requirements, not as afterthoughts.
  • Resilience and Containment: Designing systems not just to be correct, but to fail safely, with strict controls on their "blast radius."

For Liability Frameworks, this necessitates:

  • New Standards of Care: Developing legal standards that focus on the quality of an organization's governance, testing, and oversight processes, rather than on proving a specific human error.
  • Innovative Liability Regimes: Exploring new models such as tiered liability structures that distribute responsibility across the AI supply chain, mandatory insurance for high-risk AI, or no-fault compensation funds for systemic failures.
  • Regulatory Harmonization: Pursuing international standards to reduce the friction and uncertainty created by a fragmented global regulatory landscape.

The domains of governance and liability are converging. The procedural demands of governance are becoming the substantive evidence in determining liability. Enterprises that lead in developing robust, transparent, and accountable governance will not only mitigate operational risk but will also build a defensible legal and regulatory position. The challenge is immense, but the stakes—the safety, security, and reliability of our most critical infrastructure—are too high to permit inaction. The time to build the frameworks for a future of autonomous decision-making is now.

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